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Remedial and Coercive Administrative  
Proceedings Under Younger: The Tenth Circuit’s 
Test in Brown v. Day 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Tenth Circuit’s recent decision in Brown v. Day1 highlights a 
circuit split regarding the applicability of Younger abstention2 to state 
administrative proceedings. This split is rooted in two Supreme 
Court cases that have left lower courts with the difficult task of 
fleshing out their meaning. In Patsy v. Board of Regents,3 the Court 
held that exhausting administrative remedies was not required before 
federal intervention could be sought under 42 U.S.C § 1983.4 In 
Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc.,5 
however, the Court indicated that the non-exhaustion rule of Patsy 
applied to remedial, rather than coercive, administrative 
proceedings.6 Since Dayton Christian Schools, circuit courts have 
struggled in applying and dissecting the meaning of the Court’s 
remedial/coercive distinction.7  
This Note analyzes two key issues at the forefront of the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision in Brown. First, the court offers a test for 
determining the remedial or coercive nature of an administrative 
proceeding that focuses solely on the “ongoing proceeding” prong 
of Younger. This Note explores whether such a test is reasonable and 
whether it falls in line with federal abstention jurisprudence. Second, 
this Note addresses the court’s narrow and mechanical treatment of 
the remedial/coercive distinction. Brown deviates from a traditional 
 
 1. 555 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 2. “Younger abstention” refers to the judicially created doctrine of federal abstention 
first articulated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
 3. 457 U.S. 496 (1982). 
 4. Id. at 516. 
 5. 477 U.S. 619 (1986). 
 6. Id. at 627–28 n.2.  
 7. Brown v. Day, 555 F.3d 882, 896 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the divergent approaches adopted by the circuit courts in applying the 
remedial/coercive distinction). 
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Younger analysis, which requires an organic evaluation of the 
principles of equity, federalism, and comity that federal courts must 
explicitly consider in deciding whether to abstain from a state 
administrative proceeding.  
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND IN BROWN V. DAY 
A. Facts of the Case 
Dena Brown, the plaintiff, is a severely mentally disabled adult.8 
Her disability has left her with the mental capacity of a three- or 
four-year-old child.9 Due to her extreme disability, Brown requires 
constant care and supervision.10 Prior to the commencement of her 
lawsuit, Brown lived and received care at a private, non-profit 
residential care facility.11 The cost of such care exceeded her monthly 
income, which consisted solely of Social Security payments.12 Prior to 
August 2005, the federal Medicaid program covered the difference 
in Brown’s income versus her cost of care.13  
In 2003, Brown’s mother passed away, leaving her as the 
beneficiary of a residuary trust.14 The corpus of the trust included 
roughly $15,000 in cash, two annuities totaling approximately 
$23,000, and a 160-acre piece of land valued around $30,000.15 
Brown’s brother was appointed as the trustee, and Brown, given her 
disability, had no legal authority to compel distribution of the trust 
income or corpus at any time.16 As such, prior to 2004, the state of 
Kansas did not consider the trust an “available resource” in 
determining Brown’s Medicaid eligibility.17  
In July 2004, however, the Kansas legislature amended the law 
dealing with Medicaid eligibility to include within the definition of 
 
 8. Brown, 555 F.3d at 885. 
 9. Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14.  Id. at 886.  
 15. Id.  
 16.  Id. 
 17. Id. 
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“available resources” trust assets “to the extent, using the full extent 
of discretion, the trustee may make any of the income or principal 
available to the applicant or recipient of medical assistance.”18 Per the 
requirements of the revised statute, the Kansas Division of Health 
Policy and Finance (“HPF”) informed Brown that her Medicaid 
benefits would be terminated at the end of August 2005.19  
B. Procedural History  
Brown first sought relief from the termination of her Medicaid 
benefits by requesting a hearing before the HPF. She opted for the 
HPF hearing, instead of initially filing suit in federal court, because 
there was a legitimate question as to whether the amended statute 
could apply to her retroactively. Furthermore, the HPF allowed her 
to continue receiving Medicaid benefits during the pendency of her 
appeal. The hearing officer restored Brown’s benefits on the grounds 
that the amended statute did not apply retroactively. However, a 
Final Order issued by Robert Day, HPF’s director, informed Brown 
that the previous decision to terminate her benefits was being 
reinstated. The Order further stated that Brown had thirty days to 
file a petition for state judicial review.20  
A few days prior to the expiration of the allowable time period 
for Brown to seek state judicial review, she filed suit in federal district 
court naming Day, in his official capacity as director of HPF, as the 
defendant. Brown sought declaratory judgment and an injunction of 
the termination of her Medicaid coverage. The remedies sought were 
based upon Brown’s claim that Day’s decision violated 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.21  
The district court initially granted Brown’s request for a 
preliminary injunction. The court found that Day and HPF had 
acted arbitrarily in terminating Brown’s Medicaid coverage. Shortly 
after the court’s ruling, Day moved to have the case dismissed, 
arguing the court should abstain from hearing Brown’s claims given 
that she had abandoned a current state proceeding to seek federal 
 
 18. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-709(e)(3)(B) (2008 Supp.). 
 19. Brown, 555 F.3d at 886. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 886–87. 
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review. The district court agreed with Day and dismissed, citing 
Younger. The court found there was an ongoing state proceeding 
that, under the circumstances, required the federal judiciary to 
respect the state’s interest in adjudicating the matter. Brown then 
appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.22 
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Historical Roots and Development of “Our Federalism”23  
Traditionally, Ex parte Young24 is considered to be the genesis of 
Younger abstention.25 In that case, the Supreme Court issued an 
injunction against the Attorney General of Minnesota from enforcing 
a state statute dealing with reductions in railroad rates. In making its 
decision, however, the Court noted that the federal judiciary could 
not “interfere in a case where the proceedings were already pending 
in a state court.”26 A subsequent line of decisions by the Court 
established the principle that a federal court could not enjoin the 
bringing of a state prosecution except under extraordinary 
circumstances.27  
Although the basic tenets of “Our Federalism” can be found in 
pre-Younger cases, the Court, in Dombrowski v. Pfister,28 appeared to 
have opened the doors to the federal courts for those seeking 
 
 22. Id. at 887. 
 23. “Our Federalism” is synonymous with Younger abstention. The Court in Younger 
used the phrase in a discussion concerning the delicate nature of the relationship between the 
states and the federal government: 
[T]he concept . . . represent[s] . . . a system in which there is sensitivity to the 
legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the 
National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal 
rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly 
interfere with the legitimate activities of the States. 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). 
 24. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 25. MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES, COMMENTS, 
AND QUESTIONS 532 n.1 (6th ed. 2007). But see Burton D. Wechsler, Federal Courts, State 
Criminal Law and the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 740 (1974) (arguing that pre-
Young, the federal trial courts had freely given injunctive relief to federal plaintiffs). 
 26. Young, 209 U.S. at 162.  
 27. See REDISH & SHERRY, supra note 25.  
 28. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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protection from threatened criminal prosecution.29 Justice Brennan, 
writing for the Court, maintained that federal intervention, under 
Dombrowski, was only appropriate in cases dealing with the threat of 
future prosecutions, not a currently pending prosecution.30 
However, the apparent departure from previous precedent by the 
Court created uncertainty and confusion regarding the role of the 
federal judiciary as it pertained to pending or future state 
prosecutions.31  
The perception of expansive federal judicial oversight created by 
Dombrowski was narrowed in Younger v. Harris.32 The Court’s 
opinion in Younger, along with other forms of judicially created 
doctrines of abstention, requires that federal courts give great 
deference to state proceedings in the name of equity, federalism, and 
comity.33 Under Younger, the federal courts are required to abstain 
from hearing a complaint if (1) there is an ongoing state proceeding, 
(2) the state court provides an adequate forum to adjudicate the 
federal rights, and (3) the state proceeding involves an important 
state interest.34 Thus, Younger narrowed Dombrowski by holding that 
the federal courts are open only for complaints seeking protection 
from state prosecutions that would inflict irreparable harm upon the 
federal plaintiff.35 The scope of Younger abstention was traditionally 
 
 29. Robert Allen Sedler, The Dombrowski-Type Suit as an Effective Weapon for Social 
Change: Reflections from Without and Within, 18 U. KAN. L. REV. 237, 244–45 (1970).  
 30. See Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 485–86. 
 31. See generally Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Cases 
Dombrowski Forgot, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 636 (1979). 
 32. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). A year after Younger was decided, the Court, in Mitchum v. 
Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was an expressly authorized 
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. After Mitchum, the Anti-Injunction Act posed no barrier 
for plaintiffs seeking relief from state court proceedings in federal courts; however, Younger 
abstention still acts as a gatekeeper in promoting equity, federalism, and comity between the 
state and federal courts. Id. at 242–43. Therefore, § 1983 federal plaintiffs still face Younger as 
a bar in trying to bring their cases before a federal court. 
 33. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–44. 
 34. Taylor v. Jaquez, 126 F.3d 1294, 1297 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. 
at 37).  
 35. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). 
Additionally, the Court offered two additional exceptions to Younger abstention but left the 
door open for more. The first exception applies to cases involving a clear showing by the 
plaintiff of bad faith or harassment by state officials. The second exception is truly remarkable 
in that courts may intervene if the challenged statute is “‘flagrantly and patently violative of 
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left only for criminal proceedings; however, Younger has since been 
applied to quasi-criminal proceedings in the civil and administrative 
context.  
B. The Expansion of Younger to Non-Criminal Proceedings 
1. Younger in civil proceedings  
In Huffman v. Pursue, LTD.,36 the Court extended Younger to a 
civil proceeding in which the state was a party. The proceeding was 
centered on a state nuisance statute that allowed the state, in effect, 
to shut down any establishment in violation of the statute’s broad 
terms.37 In Huffman, the establishment in question was a movie 
theater showing pornographic films.38 After losing at trial in state 
court, the operators of the theater sought injunctive relief in federal 
court.39 The Supreme Court held that Younger required federal 
abstention because the “state proceeding . . . [was] akin to a criminal 
prosecution.”40 Thus, the Court held, “the State’s interest in the 
nuisance litigation [was] likely to be every bit as great as it would be 
were this a criminal proceeding.”41  
Two years later, the Court held that Younger applied to a case 
involving a state contempt proceeding in Juidice v. Vail.42 In Juidice, 
a judgment debtor sought injunctive relief from the federal court 
system after he was held in contempt by the state court.43 The federal 
district court granted the injunction, but the Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that Younger applied because “[t]he contempt 
power lies at the core of the administration of a State’s judicial 
system.”44 
 
express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever 
manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it.’” Id. at 53–54 (quoting 
Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941)). 
 36. 420 U.S. 592 (1975). 
 37. Id. at 595–97.  
 38. Id. at 595. 
 39. Id. at 598. 
 40. Id. at 604. 
 41. Id.  
 42. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).  
 43. Id. at 328–29. 
 44. Id. at 335. 
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The same year that Juidice was decided, the Supreme Court 
applied Younger to a state civil suit filed by the state in order to 
recoup fraudulently received welfare benefits in Trainor v. 
Hernandez.45 The recipients of the welfare benefits sought injunctive 
relief in federal court.46 The Supreme Court declined to give a 
definitive statement regarding the application of Younger to civil 
proceedings, but it did find abstention appropriate. The Court 
focused on the important state interest that was involved with 
administering welfare programs in making its decision to apply 
Younger.47  
Finally, the high-water mark for Younger in the setting of a civil 
proceeding, and the current standard employed today, is found in 
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco.48 Pennzoil involved a case where the state was 
not even a named party in the civil action. In that case, Texaco was 
found liable for actual and punitive damages exceeding $11 billion.49 
Texaco intended to appeal the award, but a Texas statute required 
that to postpone enforcement of the $11 billion judgment, Texaco 
would need to post bail for the amount of the award plus costs and 
interest.50 Rather than post bond, Texaco sought to enjoin Pennzoil 
in federal court from enforcing the judgment.51 The Supreme Court 
held the federalism concerns found in Younger required federal 
abstention “not only when the pending state proceedings are 
criminal, but also when certain civil proceedings are pending, if the 
State’s interests in the proceeding are so important that exercise of 
the federal judicial power would disregard the comity between the 
States and the National Government.”52 It is not entirely clear 
whether Pennzoil broadens the reach of Younger abstention to all 
civil proceedings.53  
 
 45. 431 U.S. 434 (1977).  
 46. Id. at 435–38. 
 47. Id. at 444. 
 48. 481 U.S. 1 (1987). 
 49. Id. at 4. 
 50. Id. at 4–5. 
 51. Id. at 6. 
 52. Id. at 11. 
 53. See Howard B. Stravitz, Younger Abstention Reaches A Civil Maturity: Pennzoil Co. 
v. Texaco Inc., 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 997, 1032 (1989).  
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2. Younger in administrative proceedings 
Younger abstention in civil proceedings seems rather 
uncontroversial given (1) the adequacy of the state forum to 
adjudicate federal civil claims and (2) the fact that civil litigation 
likely involves important state interests. Although these two prongs 
of Younger are not always satisfied in civil proceedings, 
administrative proceedings are even more susceptible in failing to 
offer an adequate forum for the adjudication of federal rights or to 
demonstrate the involvement of an important state interest. This, 
however, has not prevented the Court from extending Younger to 
administrative proceedings under certain circumstances.  
In Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar 
Ass’n,54 the Court applied Younger to a federal claim for injunctive 
relief against a state attorney disciplinary proceeding on the grounds 
that the proceeding “[bore] a close relationship to proceedings 
criminal in nature, as in Huffman . . . .”55 In evaluating whether the 
administrative proceeding was the type of proceeding requiring 
Younger deference, the Court noted that the state had “an extremely 
important interest in maintaining and assuring the professional 
conduct of the attorneys it licenses.”56 
The same year that Middlesex was decided, the Court held in 
Patsy v. Board of Regents57 that a teacher seeking damages under § 
1983 for sex discrimination need not exhaust her administrative 
remedies before seeking federal review of the violation of her federal 
rights.58 Following Mitchum v. Foster,59 the Court found that 
Congress, when it enacted § 1983, had expressly mandated that the 
federal judiciary assume jurisdiction for claims brought under that 
statute.60 The decision of the Court gave great weight to the mistrust 
that Congress had shown towards the inadequate, potentially biased, 
fact-finding processes of state administrative bodies.61  
 
 54. 457 U.S. 423 (1982).  
 55. Id. at 432. 
 56. Id. at 434. 
 57. 457 U.S. 496 (1982).  
 58. Id. at 516. 
 59. 407 U.S. 225 (1972); see supra note 32. 
 60. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 503. 
 61. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 505–06. 
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Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools62 
involved a subject matter similar to Patsy. In that case, Dayton 
Christian Schools sought, under § 1983, to prevent the Ohio Civil 
Rights Commission from hearing a sex discrimination complaint.63 
The Commission moved for dismissal under Younger. The Court’s 
opinion considered all components of Younger abstention in 
evaluating whether the administrative proceeding was the type of 
proceeding that deserved federal deference. After considering the 
interests of the state in the proceeding and the adequacy of the 
forum, the Court, in a footnote, distinguished Patsy on the grounds 
that the proceeding before the Court was coercive, while the 
proceeding in Patsy was remedial.64 No explanation or additional 
treatment was given to this remedial/coercive distinction. In the 
context of the opinion, however, it seems that it was one of many 
factors used by the Court in evaluating the entirety of the Younger 
doctrine.65 The failure of the Court to explain this distinction has led 
to the current circuit split.66  
3. A seven-ten split? Confusion among the courts in applying the 
remedial/coercive distinction 
Judge Tymkovich, dissenting in Brown, points out the current 
split among the circuit courts in handling the remedial/coercive 
distinction.67 On one side, the First and Tenth Circuits have 
implemented a mechanical, multi-pronged test that focuses on who 
initiated the administrative proceeding.68 If the proceeding was 
initiated by the federal plaintiff, then the proceeding is remedial; if 
the proceeding was initiated by the state, it is coercive.69 On the 
other side, the Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits have taken a 
 
 62. 477 U.S. 619 (1986).  
 63. Id. at 621. 
 64. Id. at 627 n.2.  
 65. Id. at 627 (“We have also applied [Younger] to state administrative proceedings in 
which important state interests are vindicated, so long as in the course of those proceedings the 
federal plaintiff would have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his constitutional claim.”). 
 66. Brown v. Day, 555 F.3d 882, 896 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., dissenting). 
 67. Id.  
 68. See Kercado-Melendez v. Aponte-Roque, 829 F.2d 255, 260 (1st Cir. 1987).  
 69. Brown, 555 F.3d at 889. 
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broader, more flexible approach by simply “asking whether the 
proceedings can be characterized as state enforcement 
proceedings.”70 In making this query, these circuits have held that a 
state enforcement proceeding is by definition coercive, which makes 
such proceedings “judicial in nature.”71 
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION 
A. The Court’s Interpretation of the Younger Framework 
The Tenth Circuit in Brown reversed the district court’s decision 
to abstain from a state administrative proceeding dealing with the 
termination of Medicaid benefits to a mentally handicapped person.72 
The court acknowledged three requirements that, if satisfied, 
demand federal abstention under Younger: (1) the presence of an 
ongoing state proceeding (the “ongoing proceeding” prong), (2) a 
showing that the state administrative proceeding “provides an 
adequate forum to hear the claims raised in the federal complaint” 
(the “adequacy” prong), and (3) the involvement of an important 
state interest (the “state interest” prong).73  
Within this framework, the court states that the analysis in 
determining the applicability of Younger to Brown turns solely on 
evaluating the “ongoing proceeding” prong.74 Within the “ongoing 
proceeding” prong, the court identifies two sub-parts that guide the 
analysis: (1) whether there was an ongoing state proceeding, and (2) 
whether the proceeding is the type of proceeding (the “type of 
proceeding” analysis) deserving of Younger deference.75 The court 
avoids addressing the first sub-part and focuses its analysis only on 
the “type of proceeding” sub-part. To determine if the putative 
 
 70. Id. at 896 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting).  
 71. Id. (citing Laurel Sand & Gravel v. Wilson, 519 F.3d 156, 166 (4th Cir. 2008); 
Majors v. Engelbrecht, 149 F.3d 709, 712 (7th Cir. 2007); O’Neil v. City of Philadelphia, 32 
F.3d 785, 791 n.13 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 72. See supra Part II. 
 73. Brown, 555 F.3d at 887. 
 74. See id. at 888. 
 75. Id. (“The initial prong of the Younger inquiry involves two sub-parts. This court 
must determine whether there is an ongoing state proceeding. The court must also decide 
whether that proceeding is the type of state proceeding that is due the deference accorded by 
Younger abstention.” (citations omitted)). 
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proceeding is the type of proceeding meriting Younger abstention, 
the court asks if, following Dayton Christian Schools,76 the 
proceeding is remedial or coercive.77 This query, the court 
determines, can be evaluated by applying an additional three-
pronged test based upon the standard articulated by the First 
Circuit.78  
B. The Remedial vs. Coercive Distinction 
The Tenth Circuit’s remedial/coercive test evaluates (1) 
“whether the federal plaintiff initiated the state proceeding of her 
own volition to right a wrong inflicted by the state”79 (if so, the 
proceeding is remedial); (2) whether “the federal plaintiff contends 
that the state proceeding is unlawful (coercive),”80 or whether “the 
federal plaintiff seeks a remedy for some other state-inflicted wrong 
(remedial)”;81 and (3) whether the federal plaintiff has committed 
some bad act (coercive).82 In analyzing only the remedial/coercive 
distinction within the vacuum of the “ongoing proceeding” prong, 
the court, by design, gives no express treatment to the adequacy of 
the proceeding or the possible interest that the state might have in 
such a proceeding. By limiting its analysis in such a way, the court is 
able to sidestep the tension between Patsy83 and Huffman84 
regarding the conflicting exhaustion requirements of those cases.85  
 
 76. 477 U.S. 619 (1986). 
 77. Brown, 555 F.3d at 888–90. 
 78. Id. at 889–91. 
 79. Id. at 889. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 891. 
 83. 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982). 
 84. 420 U.S. 592, 607–11 (1975).  
 85. Brown, 555 F.3d at 890 (citing Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., 
Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627–28 n.2 (1986)). A more difficult task, perhaps, than giving meaning 
to the remedial/coercive distinction, would be reconciling the apparent conflict between 
Patsy’s non-exhaustion of state administrative remedies rule and Huffman’s exhaustion of state 
appellate review requirement. The difficulty of that task lies in determining when application of 
Patsy ends and when application of Huffman begins. In other words, at what point does an 
administrative proceeding, which does not require exhaustion, become an appellate 
proceeding, which does require exhaustion? The facts of Brown highlight this problem because 
Brown had already gone through the administrative proceeding. Id. at 886. Her next option 
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In applying the above mentioned test to Brown’s administrative 
proceedings, the court found them to be remedial because (1) 
Brown initiated the proceedings, (2) the administrative “proceedings 
themselves [were] not the challenged state conduct,” and (3) Brown 
“committed no cognizable bad act that would have precipitated state 
coercive proceedings.”86 The Tenth Circuit rejected the district 
court’s finding that the state had initiated the proceedings by 
eliminating Brown’s Medicaid benefits in the first place.87 The court 
did not accept that the decision to terminate Brown’s Medicaid 
benefits fit within Younger’s “traditional roots” that allows for the 
expansion of federal abstention doctrine to proceedings similar to a 
criminal prosecution. In other words, Younger applies “in situations 
where federal involvement would block a state’s efforts to enforce its 
laws.”88 It appears the court argued that Younger does not apply to 
an administrative proceeding seeking relief from the summarily 
terminated Medicaid benefits of an individual given the absence of 
even the veneer of judicial process.89 If this is the case, such an 
argument would be consistent with Justice Scalia’s statement in New 
Orleans Public Service v. Council of New Orleans90 that the Supreme 
Court has “never extended [Younger] to proceedings that are not 
‘judicial in nature.’”91 
V. ANALYSIS 
The critique of the Brown decision offered by this Note is not 
aimed at contrasting and comparing the different approaches taken 
by the circuit courts in applying the coercive/remedial distinction. 
 
was to seek state judicial review of the administrative proceeding from a state trial court. The 
court is able to completely avoid this issue by limiting its analysis to the remedial/coercive 
distinction within its interpretation of the Younger framework.  
 86. Id. at 893. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. (citations omitted).  
 89. See Maymo-Melendez v. Alvarez-Ramirez, 364 F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(“Huffman is a reliable guide only where full-fledged state administrative proceedings of a 
judicial character and, arguably, of a coercive nature, are directed against the federal 
plaintiff.”).  
 90. 491 U.S. 350 (1989). 
 91. Id. at 370 (quoting Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n., 
457 U.S. 423, 433–34 (1982)). 
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Judge Tymkovich, dissenting, lays out an excellent argument as to 
why the approach taken by the several other circuits should be 
followed instead of the test adopted by the First Circuit.92 Nor is the 
purpose of this Note to challenge the result reached by the Tenth 
Circuit. The limited and narrow focus of this Note is simply to ask 
whether the Tenth Circuit’s analysis is logically consistent and 
generally consistent with Younger abstention jurisprudence. The 
answer to both inquiries is no.  
The means by which the Tenth Circuit achieved the result in 
Brown is not conducive to the broad, free-flowing discussions 
regarding equity, federalism, and comity usually found in Younger 
abstention cases. The court appears to view the remedial/coercive 
analysis of an administrative proceeding in a binary fashion. That is, 
an administrative proceeding is either remedial or it is coercive 
depending upon the application of a few simple factors. This vision 
would justify the mechanical test adopted by the court; however, the 
heart of Younger is a careful balancing test that pits the interests of 
the federal judiciary in protecting federal rights against the interests 
of the states in furthering matters of state law and policy.93 The 
Tenth Circuit test, unfortunately, substitutes the nuanced flexibility 
of a traditional Younger analysis with a bright-lined, multi-pronged 
test that fails to capture the core concepts of “Our Federalism.” 
A. Does Brown’s Treatment of the Remedial/Coercive Distinction 
Make Sense? 
As previously stated, it is currently unclear how much weight 
courts should give the remedial/coercive distinction or how and 
when it should be applied within the broader framework of Younger 
abstention.94 The Tenth Circuit, as previously explained, has created 
a sub-prong to the first part of the Younger analysis, namely the 
ongoing proceeding prong.95 The purpose of this sub-prong is to 
evaluate whether a proceeding is the type of proceeding that should 
 
 92. Brown, 555 F.3d at 894–906 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting). 
 93. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971). 
 94. Brown, 555 F.3d at 896–97 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting). 
 95. Id. at 888 (majority opinion). 
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be given Younger deference.96 This construction of Younger places 
the entire weight of the analysis within the sterile confines of the 
court’s own remedial/coercive test with no consideration given to 
the adequacy of the state forum or the state’s interest in the matter. 
Without further explanation from the court, it is difficult to 
understand why an analysis of whether a certain type of proceeding 
should be given Younger deference is placed solely within a 
discussion of Younger’s ongoing proceeding prong. After all, the 
million dollar question behind every Younger abstention case is 
whether the proceeding is the type of proceeding meriting federal 
deference. The court relies on New Orleans Public Service in 
justifying its type of proceeding analysis; however, the analysis in 
New Orleans Public Service does not call upon an analysis as 
constructed by the Tenth Circuit. The adequacy and state interest 
prongs of Younger should also be evaluated because the type of 
proceeding analysis has implications that permeate the entire 
Younger discussion.  
It seems obvious that an analysis of the ongoing proceeding 
prong would include a discussion of whether the putative proceeding 
is the type of proceeding that deserves Younger deference. The 
Tenth Circuit’s refusal to apply this discussion to the rest of 
Younger, however, is where the court’s test begins to come undone. 
The type of proceeding analysis inherently requires an evaluation of 
the adequacy of the state forum to hear the federal complaint and 
the state’s interest in the underlying matter. How can a federal court 
decide if a proceeding is the type deserving of federal abstention 
without expressly evaluating the adequacy of the state forum or the 
state’s interest in adjudicating the matter? The Tenth Circuit 
attempts to avoid the adequacy and state interest prongs of Younger, 
but the influence of those factors can be found beneath the surface 
of the court’s decision.97  
The remedial/coercive distinction is especially relevant in 
evaluating the state’s interest in an administrative proceeding. 
Although no explanation is offered by the Supreme Court, a 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. It seems reasonable to speculate that the court’s narrow application of the 
remedial/coercive distinction was done to avoid the greater uncertainty surrounding the Patsy 
and Huffman exhaustion requirements. See supra note 85. 
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reasonable argument for the denial of Younger deference to remedial 
proceedings is that such proceedings, generally, will not involve 
important matters of state interest that would require federal 
abstention. This presumes that states have a greater interest in 
coercive proceedings that enforce state laws than in proceedings that 
merely seek to remedy a wrong done to an individual by the state. 
Using the remedial/coercive distinction in determining the extent of 
the interest that a state has in an administrative proceeding as part of 
the “type of proceeding” analysis is a better way to organically apply 
Younger in its entirety, rather than the mechanical, 
compartmentalized test offered by the Tenth Circuit. 
Furthermore, the remedial/coercive distinction naturally assists 
in evaluating Younger’s adequacy prong as well. New Orleans Public 
Service tells us that the elements of Younger are to be evaluated by 
determining whether the putative proceeding is “judicial in 
nature.”98 This follows because, presumably, a proceeding that is 
judicial in nature will likely provide an adequate forum to adjudicate 
the federal issues underlying the federal complaint. In asking 
whether a proceeding is judicial in nature, an analysis of the 
remedial/coercive status of the proceeding would be helpful in 
further evaluating the adequacy of the state forum because a 
proceeding that is coercive, e.g., a proceeding in which the state 
seeks to enforce its laws, will likely provide a sufficient process by 
which a state defendant may have her federal complaint properly 
heard. Assuming the state has an interest in enforcing its laws and 
protecting the federal rights of its citizens, it seems reasonable that 
the state will provide adequate, judicial-like forums to enforce those 
laws. Thus, Brown offers an inadequate treatment of the 
remedial/coercive distinction, as the court should have applied the 
distinction to all parts of the Younger analysis.  
B. Is Brown Consistent with the Broad Principles of Younger 
Abstention? 
Brown’s creation of a test consisting of a convoluted maze of 
prongs and their sub-prongs is at odds with the core principles of 
 
 98. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 370 
(1989). 
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“Our Federalism.” Essentially, Brown turned on the fact that Brown 
(1) initiated the administrative proceeding, (2) was challenging the 
application of a new law rather than the lawfulness of the 
proceeding, and (3) committed no bad act. As previously argued, the 
remedial/coercive distinction seems to require consideration of all 
factors that make up the Younger analysis. The three prongs of 
Younger, identified by the Tenth Circuit, set out to evaluate just 
how important a given proceeding is to a state. The interest of the 
federal judiciary in adjudicating federal rights is presumed. Only by a 
showing that a state’s interest in a proceeding is of sufficient 
importance should a federal court abstain for the sake of avoiding the 
potentially harmful friction between state and federal governments 
that Younger abstention is designed to prevent.  
It is hard to see where in the Tenth Circuit’s test there is room 
for the careful balancing of state and federal interests as required by 
Younger. It could be argued that such a discussion is imbedded 
within the three sub-prongs found in the court’s test; however, it is 
just as reasonable, if not more so, to argue that a nuanced 
application of a traditional Younger analysis will be lost in the 
mechanics of the court’s standard. The Tenth Circuit’s multi-
pronged test does not embody the principles of equity, federalism, 
and comity that require explicit consideration under Younger. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Tenth Circuit’s test in Brown may have the appearance of a 
clean, predictable legal standard; however, the court’s isolated 
application of the remedial/coercive distinction to only the ongoing 
proceeding prong of Younger contradicts the notion of “Our 
Federalism.” Federal abstention jurisprudence has demonstrated over 
time that Younger abstention is an extremely fact-sensitive endeavor. 
To implement a test that focuses on a narrow set of factors, without 
considering the adequacy of the state forum or the interests of the 
state explicitly, prevents the federal courts from being able to 
properly balance the competing interests of the federal and state 
governments that are at the core of “Our Federalism.” Although the 
outcome reached in Brown v. Day is what may be required under 
Younger, the standard articulated by the Tenth Circuit is 
unsupported by federal abstention jurisprudence.  
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